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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you use Facebook as your primary means to stay in touch
with family and friends. You are constantly on the go and your mobile
phone is how you prefer to stay connected to Facebook. You check it in the
morning, during breaks, at lunch, on the train home, and even before bed.
And then, one day, Facebook will not load. You receive an error message
where your friends’ status updates should be. In place of your Facebook
wall, the number to your carrier’s customer service department appears.
Your mobile broadband provider has permanently blocked your access to
Facebook unless you are willing to pay an additional monthly fee. In this
example, Facebook is representative of any site or service you can access
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from your mobile phone. 1 Your mobile broadband provider has the power
to decide what sites or services you use and can charge you extra to access
the ones you use most. This could be the future of the mobile internet. It
does not, however, have to be this way. Mobile broadband can remain an
open and free forum for ideas, speech, and innovation if enforceable rules
are adopted to protect it.
Whether it is used for important business transactions or simply to
catch up on the news of the day, high-speed broadband internet has become
an indispensible resource to many. 2 Nearly three-quarters of American
adults use the Internet. 3 Americans spend nearly as much money each year
on the ability to move information over cable and telephone lines as they do
on gas and heating oil. 4 Of the many ways to access the Internet, people are
increasingly turning to their mobile phones. Recently, mobile internet
access has experienced even more explosive growth than fixed internet
access and has become the fastest growing broadband segment. 5 As the
voice services market becomes saturated, wireless carriers are turning to
broadband to drive growth and bolster their bottom lines. 6 Mobile broadband is expected to become the primary means by which people access the
Internet in the near future. 7 Most internet users are accustomed to the free
and open character of the Internet, which allows them to access any site or
content they choose, without interference from their internet service provider (ISP) (such as AT&T, Comcast, or Verizon). Those free and open principals, however, are at a crossroads. Service providers have begun to block
sites and services, limiting what users are able to access without their
1. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Google’s Net Neutrality Stance Gives Net’s Future to
Corporations: By Protecting Short Term Interests, Google is Acting Like Just Another Company,
MSNBC
(Aug.
8,
2010,
4:09
PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38645475/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets.
2. Edward B. Mulligan V, Derailed by the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network Management Regulation Back on Track, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 633, 634 (2010).
3. Lee Rainie, Internet, Broadband, and Cell Phone Statistics, PEW RES. CENTER 1
(Jan. 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_December09_
update.pdf.
N.Y.
TIMES,
(July
30,
2008),
4. Tim
Wu,
OPEC
2.0,
http://www.webcitation.org/5eMzmLARb.
5. Commissioner Meredith Atwell Baker, Advancing Consumer Interests Through
Ubiquitous Broadband: The Need for a New Spectrum, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 5 (2010).
6. See id. at 5 (noting that eighty-five percent of Americans own cell phones); 2nd
(July
23,
2010),
Quarter
2010
Earnings
Conference
Call,
VERIZON
http://news.vzw.com/investor/20100723.pdf (showing wireless data as the second largest
revenue growth segment); 2nd Quarter 2010 Investor Briefing, AT&T (July 22, 2010),
http://www.att.com/Investor/Financial/Earning_Info/docs/2Q_10_IB_FINAL.pdf (stating in
the introduction that the quarterly financial results were driven by growth in mobile broadband).
7. Baker, supra note 5 (noting that by the year 2020, mobile broadband access will
be the primary method to connect to the internet for most users).
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knowledge or consent. 8 These actions have fueled the debate about whether
the Internet should remain free and open, and if so, how to effectively regulate it. They have also led to the adoption of net neutrality rules by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 9
There are two separate and distinct fronts involved in the debate about
preserving an open internet. The first is the traditional or wireline broadband, such as a typical home or work computer. The second is mobile
broadband, which is accessed through a wireless cellular network. 10 The
two different fronts pose unique challenges and issues, 11 but ultimately
should be regulated in the same manner. Some organizations have already
recognized the need for wireline net neutrality. 12 Wireless networks, however, have not been given the same level of protection that wireline networks are afforded. 13 In order to truly preserve the openness and freedom of
the Internet, mobile broadband networks must be protected.
This Comment argues that mobile networks must be given the same
protections that are afforded to fixed networks to ensure the future of a free,
open, innovative, and competitive Internet. Additionally, it maintains that
the recently-adopted FCC rules will be ineffective in this capacity for two
reasons. First, the rules adopted are unenforceable because the FCC lacks
jurisdiction over network management. Second, the rules as adopted are
inadequate to protect mobile network users. Failure to apply a rule prohibiting unreasonable discrimination and a full no blocking rule to mobile network operators will prove fatal to the effectiveness of the rules as mobile
broadband is rapidly becoming the primary method of accessing the Internet.
Part II of this comment describes what net neutrality is. Part III explains why net neutrality is important to consumers. Part IV discusses the
8. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
9. The FCC’s net neutrality rules were recently codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 47 CFR § 8.
10. Verizon-Google
Legislative
Framework
Proposal,
http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Fgoogleblogs%2
Fpdfs%2Fverizon_google_legislative_framework_proposal_081010.pdf (last visited Sept.
30 2010).
11. Id. (stating that wireless networks have “unique technical and operational characteristics”).
12. See id. (explaining Verizon and Google’s joint proposal protecting wireline net
neutrality); Gary Bensinger, AT&T Says Google-Verizon Plan ‘Reasonable’, BUSINESSWEEK
(Aug. 11, 2010, 2:58 P.M.) http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-08-11/at-t-saysgoogle-verizon-internet-plan-reasonable-.html (supporting the Verizon-Google Plan).
13. Report and Order In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION (Dec. 23, 2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10201A1.pdf [hereinafter Internet Rules]. The rules create two different standards—one set of
rules for fixed broadband providers, and another much less stringent set of rules for mobile
broadband providers. Id.
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regulatory scheme for net neutrality that existed prior to the adoption of the
FCC’s net neutrality rules and will persist after the rules are invalidated.
Part V argues that the rules adopted by the FCC are unenforceable because
they lack an adequate legal foothold. Part VI provides an overview of the
mobile broadband marketplace, and discusses each rule and how it applies
to mobile broadband networks. It goes on to argue that the exclusion of
mobile broadband networks from some of the rules makes them inadequate
to protect mobile broadband users.
II.

WHAT IS NET NEUTRALITY?

Net neutrality refers to the free and open principles that have fostered
the explosive growth of the Internet. 14 It is a concept that nearly everyone
has experienced but almost no one appreciates. Net neutrality allows internet users to access internet content, applications, and services of their
choice without interference from internet service providers.15 In simpler
terms, a user can visit any legal website or use any legal internet service or
application they choose. Until recently, due to the absence of net neutrality
regulations, internet service providers could freely block, degrade, or prioritize internet traffic.16 How, or if, content was delivered was at the discretion of the ISP, giving it complete control over what internet users could
access. 17 While blocking has not yet been widely used, if these practices are
allowed to grow and evolve, they will fundamentally change the way the
Internet works.
Net neutrality is credited for the explosive growth and innovation of
the Internet and internet-based applications and services. 18 In a short period
of time, the Internet has grown from a small science experiment into a massive global system that hundreds of millions of people around the world
use, partly because it is an open and free forum for speech.19 Many ground14. Id. at 3 (“[T]he Internet has thrived because of its freedom and openness.”).
15. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986, 14987-88 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy Statement].
16. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that although
they have been used, the practices of discrimination and blocking have not been widely
employed by ISPs to this point).
17. See Carol M. Hayes, Content Discrimination on the Internet: Calls for Regulation of Net Neutrality, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 493, 512 (2009); Robert A. Penchuk,
Comment, Unleashing the Open Mobile Internet, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 74, 79 (2009) (“Advocates of network neutrality argue…that a handful of providers are unfairly controlling the
terms of access.”); Engadget Explains Net Neutrality-And Our Full Interview with Tim Wu!,
ENGADGET (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.engadget.com/2010/09/24/engadget-explains-netneutrality-and-our-full-interview-with/ [hereinafter Engadget Explains Net Neutrality].
18. Baker, supra note 5; see also Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 3.
19. See Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 3.
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breaking services that now seem indispensible have been developed as a
result of this rapid growth, including: e-mail, voice-over-internet-protocol
(VOIP), and peer-to-peer networks, just to name a few. 20 If neutrality is not
preserved, innovation of new internet applications and services will be suppressed. 21 There are two ISP practices that especially trouble advocates of
an open internet. The first is blocking or discriminating against traffic by
the ISP, based on its content. 22 The second is paid prioritization of internet
traffic, where ISPs place some traffic into a new “fast lane” for those who
pay and relegate everyone else to the “slow lane.” 23
A.

DISCRIMINATION AND BLOCKING

“Discrimination,” or “blocking,” is when an internet service provider
(ISP) intentionally interferes with a user’s traffic either by slowing down
the delivery of information to the user’s computer or completely denying
access to the site or service altogether.24 Discrimination or blocking of internet traffic is not always a bad thing. There are times when an ISP needs
to manage the traffic on its network in order to prevent one user from degrading other users’ internet experiences. 25 Network management is a practice that, if performed correctly, can benefit users. When it is misused,
however, it can have serious repercussions.
The explosive rate of broadband adoption and the introduction of new,
bandwidth-intensive services have substantially increased the demands
placed on service providers’ network infrastructures. 26 This increased demand for bandwidth can push the limits of an ISP’s network capabilities. 27
Different applications and services use varying amounts of bandwidth. 28
For example, downloading a high-definition video requires substantially
more bandwidth than just browsing the web or checking e-mail. In order to
20. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 81.
21. See Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
22. Hayes, supra note 17, at 512-13.
23. Id. at 500.
24. Adam Clay, Unlocking the Wireless Safe: Opening up the Wireless World for
Consumers, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 715, 721 (2009) (quoting Cheryl A. Tritt, Telecommunications Future, 920 PLI/Pat 133, 138-39 (2007)) (Net neutrality “prevents . . . ‘operators from
blocking or impairing users’ access to lawful Internet sites and services’”); see Hayes, supra
note 17, at 499-500 (discussing AT&T’s blockage of anti-Bush lyrics at Lollapalooza and
Verizon’s block of a pro-choice organization’s opt-in text messages).
25. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 637 (discussing the need for ISPs to manage traffic
due to network congestion).
26. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 75 (noting that some applications use substantially
more bandwidth than others and internet service providers must manage their networks as a
result).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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counteract the effects of demand exceeding supply, ISPs must engage in
network management practices.29 One commentator likened the issue of
network management to a three-lane-highway carrying traffic four vehicles
across. 30 In order for cars to move forward, one of the cars, typically the
largest, must be slowed. 31 In the network management context, the largest
car would be the user who is consuming the most bandwidth. This network
management practice attempts to provide a uniform customer experience to
all of a service provider’s customers by preventing one individual from
consuming too much bandwidth and degrading other users’ traffic.32
The problems arise when an ISP is not managing traffic based on the
amount of bandwidth being used, but rather what site consumers have chosen to visit or what service or applications they are using, independent of
the traffic conditions on the network. 33 The ability of ISPs to discriminate
against traffic based on the site or service being accessed has serious implications for consumers. This issue was brought to the general public’s attention when it was discovered that Comcast was discriminating against peerto-peer networks, blocking customers’ ability to access those sites and their
associated services. 34 This type of network management practice restricts
users’ freedom to choose what sites and services they visit or use. It allows
broadband service providers to become the gatekeepers to the Internet because it gives them free reign to screen or block traffic in any manner they
choose. 35 Some opponents of net neutrality regulation use a market-based
model which argues that by allowing traffic discrimination, more internet
service providers will enter the marketplace and encourage innovation and
competition. 36 ISPs should not, however, be able to manage traffic based
upon the content. Network management practices should be limited to a
method based only on the technical demands being placed on the network,
not the site or service being used.

29. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 637.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Mulligan, supra note 2; see also Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
35. See Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that broadband providers have
blocked or degraded traffic without disclosing it to customers, in spite of the FCC’s Internet
Policy Statement).
36. Hayes, supra note 17 (theorizing that if service providers are allowed to discriminate against traffic freely, it will encourage the innovation of alternatives to DSL and
Cable services).
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PAID PRIORITIZATION

In addition to traffic discrimination, paid prioritization is a concern
among net neutrality proponents. 37 Paid prioritization is defined as “preferential treatment of some Internet traffic over other traffic” based on a content provider, such as Google, paying the service provider to deliver its sites
and services faster than its competitors. 38 If adopted, the model would
create a fast lane and a slow lane for internet traffic. 39 Paid prioritization
would effectively “close the open Internet.” 40 Large content providers
would be able to outspend smaller competitors whose traffic would be degraded, essentially stifling competition.41 Small companies would be stuck
in the slow lane, making it difficult to gain market share because consumers
would be drawn to the faster services. 42 Furthermore, a large company
could purchase a virtually exclusive license with an ISP to deliver its traffic, effectively precluding competition.43 Paid prioritization is contrary to
the fundamental principles of the open and free Internet. 44 This model
would also be detrimental to consumers because content providers are likely to pass along to consumers the costs of prioritizing their content.45 Service providers, on the other hand, would receive a windfall because they
would be paid by both the consumer and the content provider for delivering
the same content they would be delivering anyway.
III.

WHY IS NET NEUTRALITY IMPORTANT?

Net neutrality is one of the most important issues of the twenty-first
century. It has been argued that net neutrality is so important that it should
be guaranteed to internet users. 46 Proponents of net neutrality assert three
37. House Dems: FCC Must Reject Google-Verizon Deal to Ensure Net Neutrality,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/housedems-fcc-must-rejec_n_684778.html?igoogle=1.
38. Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to
Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 460 (2009).
39. Hayes, supra note 17, at 500-01.
40. House Dems: FCC Must Reject Google-Verizon Deal to Ensure Net Neutrality,
supra note 36.
41. Id.
42. Hayes, supra note 17, at 501.
43. Id. at 513.
44. Id.
45. See Net Neutrality, “Paid Prioritization,” and “Network Management” – Part
I, ECON. & TECH. INC. (Sept. 2010), http://www.econtech.com/newsletter/september2010/
september2010a2.php (discussing the lack of competition among broadband providers as a
primary reason that costs to consumers will escalate).
46. Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17 (arguing that net neutrality
should be a public duty).
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principle arguments in support of their position that there is currently a need
for effective regulation: (1) the low number of market participants will ultimately result in competition being stifled, (2) unreasonable discrimination
or blocking of internet traffic will discourage innovation, and (3) free
speech will be suppressed if traffic can be interfered with by service providers. 47 The potential consequences of any one of these scenarios being
realized is evidence of the need for net neutrality regulation.
The first argument by net neutrality proponents is that competition will
be stifled by the low number of market participants. This argument is premised on service providers acting as an oligopoly, controlling the market
and discouraging competition. 48 Broadband providers have been likened to
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); it sets the
prices high to guarantee a large profit and then makes investments in its
infrastructure that serve to bolster its natural monopolies, thereby exacerbating barriers to market entry. 49
The second argument, that innovation will be discouraged by traffic
interference, asserts that “[d]iscriminatory access would stifle Internet development” because ISPs are able to discriminate against competing content or services. 50 Much of the explosion of innovation around internet services and content was a product of the non-discriminatory nature of the
Internet. 51 If service providers are allowed to discriminate freely, they could
block services that competed with their own. 52 Without easy access to the
marketplace, entrepreneurs and innovators will be discouraged from developing new products and services. 53
Finally, and most importantly, proponents of net neutrality argue that
it is essential to maintaining free speech. 54 If neutrality is permitted to evaporate, allowing ISPs and content providers to control what content or information is available to users, a very potent forum of free speech will be
lost. 55 Amateur speech will be the most significantly impeded because the
Internet is the preeminent forum for such ideas to be disseminated rapidly
and effectively to the masses. 56 Commercial content, similar to commercial
programming, will dominate the Internet landscape, as it does in the televi47. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 81.
48. Id.
49. Wu, supra note 4.
50. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 81.
51. Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
52. Id. (discussing the ability of a carrier to block Skype because it offered voice
services).
53. Hayes, supra note 17, at 512-13 (discussing net neutrality supporters’ position
that discrimination will make it more difficult for new companies to break into the market).
54. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 82.
55. Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
56. Id.
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sion marketplace. 57 The internet service providers and a few large content
providers, such as Apple and Google, will have the ability to determine
what content users can access on the Internet. 58 Similar to television where
only a few large broadcasters control all the programming, anything that is
not a commercial production, such as amateur speech, will become scarce
and increasingly difficult to access. 59 The ISPs and their affiliates will be
able to create a “walled garden” where they direct users’ traffic among each
other’s sites. 60
IV. REGULATORY SCHEME PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE FCC’S NET
NEUTRALITY RULES
Currently, there are no federal laws in place that directly address network management or net neutrality. 61 Congress has been unable to gain
enough support to pass net neutrality legislation.62 A number of bills have
been introduced but none have been adopted. 63 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency responsible for regulating wired and
radio communications, is the agency likely to be delegated authority should
Congress act. 64 The FCC can exercise its authority to regulate communications pursuant to direct statutory delegation or through its ancillary jurisdiction 65 if it is “reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of its
statutorily mandated responsibilities.” 66 Congress has not statutorily delegated to the FCC the authority to regulate the Internet. 67 Further, the FCC
has effectively precluded itself from using its ancillary jurisdiction over
cable internet services 68 and DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) services, 69 clas-

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 82.
61. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 635.
62. Hayes, supra note 17, at 501-03.
63. Id. (discussing multiple bills and amendments that have been introduced and
subsequently faltered).
64. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
65. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 644 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
67. Comcast, 600 F.3d. at 645-46 (stating that the FCC “does not claim that Congress has given it express authority to regulate . . . Internet service”). Because there has been
express congressional delegation, the Commission attempted to rely on its ancillary authority
as grounds for its jurisdiction over the internet. Id. The court rejected the FCC’s ancillary
jurisdiction as grounds for regulating the internet. Id. at 644.
68. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access To The Internet Over Cable And Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002).
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sifying both as information services rather than telecommunications services. In 2005, the FCC adopted an Internet policy statement that contained
principles the FCC determined were essential for the continuation of an
open and competitive Internet, believing it would be sufficient to protect the
Internet. 70 The core principles espoused in the policy statement are that
consumers are entitled to access the lawful content, services, and applications of their choosing and they can attach any legal device that does not
harm the network. 71 The consequence of the FCC’s decision to classify
broadband cable and DSL as information services is that it leaves service
providers free to discriminate against traffic on their networks without any
recourse available to paying customers.72 The FCC soon realized that relying solely upon a policy statement was not adequate to protect the freedom
of the Internet.
The Commission’s poor choice to classify broadband as an information service and the lack of its policy statement’s effectiveness were revealed in Comcast Corp. v. FCC. 73 After receiving a complaint against
Comcast, the nation’s second largest ISP, 74 for blocking users’ access to
peer-to-peer (P2P) sites, the FCC attempted to exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to regulate Comcast’s network management practices 75 using a congressional statement that it is the policy of the United States to encourage
Internet development as its jurisdictional basis.76 The Commission determined that Comcast’s actions in blocking legal internet traffic were contrary to the principles established in the Commission’s Internet Policy
Statement and frustrated the purposes of the asserted congressional policy. 77 Comcast agreed to change its network management practices and the
Commission ordered a disclosure detailing the progression of the changes. 78
Although Comcast agreed to change how it managed its network, it ap69. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 10 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150A1.pdf.
70. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 15, at 14988.
71. Id.
72. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 80-81.
73. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
74. 2nd
Quarter
2010
Results,
COMCAST,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/CMCSA/1009393692x0x390362/49bc4416-c5b14191-b0e9-2446d0639502/Comcast_Q2Release_7.27.10.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (stating that Comcast has over sixteen million high speed internet customers).
75. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-To-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008)
[hereinafter Comcast Order].
76. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651.
77. Id.; Internet Policy Statement, supra note 15, at 14988.
78. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645.
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pealed the order to the District of Columbia Circuit Court.79 The court vacated the order finding that the authority to regulate network management
was not delegated to the FCC by Congress 80 and did not fall within the
Commission’s ancillary jurisdiction, because cable broadband was classified as an information service rather than a telecommunications service.81
The court reiterated the position that policy statements do not carry the
force of law and invalidated the Commission’s ancillary jurisdiction justification and its order in its entirety. 82
The Comcast decision left a vacuum where regulations for network
management should exist. 83 There are multiple agencies that could regulate
net neutrality, but the FCC is the most likely to end up doing so. 84 There are
two practical ways by which the FCC could establish jurisdiction over
broadband internet services and, by implication, net neutrality. 85 First, the
FCC could wait for Congress to statutorily delegate the Commission the
direct authority to do so.86 Given the inability to garner even moderate support for anything related to net neutrality in Congress, however, statutory
delegation is unlikely to occur anytime soon. 87 Second, the FCC could reclassify cable and other broadband services so they fall under its statutory
delegations as they currently exist.88 This is the most practical option.
The FCC has the ability to autonomously reclassify cable and DSL
services as telecommunications services instead of information services,
bringing them back under its direct regulatory authority. 89 The Supreme
Court held that the “Commission is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course if it adequately justifies the change,” referring to
the FCC’s classification of cable and DSL broadband as information services. 90 Additionally, reclassification requires very little involvement from
outside entities. 91 If the FCC were to establish jurisdiction over broadband
internet by reclassifying cable and DSL, it could then begin regulating the
79. Id.
80. Id. at 661.
81. Id. at 645.
82. Id. at 644.
83. See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 635.
84. Hayes, supra note 17, at 503-05 (discussing the smaller role of the Federal
Trade Commission in regulating net neutrality).
85. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 650-51.
86. Id.
87. See Cecilia King, Waxman Says Net Neutrality Bill Dead, FCC Should Assert
POST
(Sept.
29,
2010,
5:02
PM),
Regulatory
Authority,
WASH.
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/09/rep_waxman_says_net_neutrality.html.
88. Id.
89. See Nat’l Cable and Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1001 (2005).
90. Id.
91. Mulligan, supra note 2, at 635.
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network management practices of service providers to ensure the Internet
remains a free and open environment that promotes innovation and competition in accordance with the Commission’s policy statement.92 The Commission, however, declined to follow either of the practical solutions. Instead, in response to the Comcast decision, it adopted net neutrality rules
that are both unenforceable and ineffective.93
V. THE FCC’S NET NEUTRALITY RULES AND WHY THEY ARE NOT
LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
On December 21, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission
voted three to two, adopting net neutrality rules.94 The rules adopted by the
FCC are intended to be high-level “rules of the road . . . .” 95 The Order consists of three general rules. The first rule is transparency. 96 It requires that
broadband service providers disclose their network practices, performance
characteristics, and commercial terms for consumers, the FCC, and third
parties. 97 Second, the FCC adopted a No-Blocking rule. 98 The No-Blocking
Rule prevents fixed broadband providers from blocking lawful content,
applications, services, and non-harmful devices and also prevents mobile
operators from blocking lawful websites, voice, or video telephony services
that compete with its own offerings.99 Third, the Commission adopted a
rule prohibiting fixed broadband providers from unreasonable discrimination. 100 This rule allows for ISPs to engage in reasonable network management, but prevents them from discriminating against or degrading traffic
from sites or services for other reasons, such as paid prioritization. 101 Each
individual rule is discussed in more detail in Part VI of this Comment. The
net neutrality rules adopted by the FCC are unenforceable because the
92. Id.
93. Internet Rules, supra note 13.
94. Press Release, FCC Acts to Preserve Internet Freedom and Openness, Fed.
Comm.
Commission
(Dec.
21,
2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303745A1.pdf
[hereinafter FCC Press Release] (stating that Commissioner Genachowski with Commissioners Copps and Clyburn voted to approve the rules while Commissioners Baker and
McDowell voted against them).
95. Chairman Julius Genachowski Statement on Preserving Internet Freedom and
COMM.
COMMISSION,
1
(Dec.
21,
2010),
Openness,
FED.
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303746A1.pdf
[hereinafter Genachowski Statement].
96. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 32.
97. Id. at 32-37.
98. Id. at 37.
99. Id. at 38, 55.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 40.
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Commission lacks legal authority to establish the rules. 102 The absence of
legal grounds to adopt the rules is recognized by both dissenting Commissioners 103 and even appears to be questioned by Commissioners who voted
in favor of adopting the rules. 104 The majority relied upon a large number of
legal grounds to attempt to establish its jurisdiction and authority to adopt
the Order. 105 The Order uses many different legal grounds to compensate
for the lack of a quality footing. 106 The Order, however, focused most of its
attention on Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and therefore will be the focus of this section.107
Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act directs the FCC to
“encourage the deployment of ‘advanced telecommunications capability,’”
including broadband internet access.108 Section 706 was also the thrust of
the Commission’s grounds for jurisdiction in the Comcast decision. 109 In
Comcast, the court expressly rejected the contention that Section 706 conferred authority to the FCC to regulate network management, relying on a
previous FCC order (Advanced Services Order) 110 that interpreted Section
706 not to be an independent grant of authority. 111 The court held that Section 706 could not be used to bring something under ancillary jurisdiction
absent some specific delegated authority already within the Act.112 The
102. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION,
9-13
(Dec.
21
2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303746A5.pdf
[hereinafter Baker Statement] (discussing the reasons the FCC lacks legal authority).
103. Id.; Statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION,
4-6
(Dec.
21,
2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303746A3.pdf
[hereinafter McDowell Statement].
104. Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps Concurring, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION,
5
(Dec.
21,
2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303746A2.pdf
[hereinafter Copps Statement] (stating that the order would be an important milestone “if
upheld by the courts”); Statement of FCC Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION,
2
(Dec.
21,
2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1221/DOC-303746A4.pdf
[hereinafter Clyburn Statement] (stating she believes it is appropriate for the FCC to act but
“judicial review ultimately will determine the fate of this Order”).
105. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 62-77; Baker Statement, supra note 102, at 10
(stating that the majority uses twenty-four different legal bases for jurisdiction).
106. Baker Statement, supra note 102, at 101.
107. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 64.
108. Id.
109. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
110. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Memorandum Opinion & Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd
24,012 ¶ 74 (1998) [hereinafter Advanced Services Order].
111. Id.
112. Id. at 659.
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commissioners, however, asserted that Section 706 confers an affirmative
duty “to take actions to encourage the deployment of ‘advanced telecommunications technology,’” 113 essentially creating an independent grant of
authority and reversing its previous reading of Section 706. 114 Under this
interpretation of Section 706, Congress delegated direct authority to regulate the Internet to the FCC. 115 In order to avoid conflict with the Advanced
Services Order, the majority attempts to narrow its previous interpretation
of that order and avers that the Comcast court read it too broadly. 116 The
Order endeavors to turn a deregulatory law into new regulation and will
ultimately be struck down in court. 117 The District of Columbia Circuit
Court in Comcast reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding that an agency
“may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub silentio,” 118 which is exactly
what the Commission is attempting to do in its Order.119
The Commission also attempts to bring the Internet under its ancillary
jurisdiction by anchoring it to other parts of the Communications Act, 120
including spectrum licensing and its authority to protect end users of voice,
video, and audio services, among others. 121 These are unlikely to be sustained as adequate legal grounds for the Order because the Commission’s
ancillary jurisdiction can only be used secondarily to something already
contained in the Act. 122 There is no statutory delegation to regulate the internet by Congress and therefore no grounds for ancillary jurisdiction. 123
The Commission’s lack of authority is further demonstrated by bills introduced into Congress that, if approved, would have directly delegated the
authority to regulate the Internet to the FCC. 124 If the FCC already had authority, there would be no need for Congress to introduce multiple bills
delegating authority to them. 125

113. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 64 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1302).
114. McDowell Statement, supra note 103, at 5.
115. Id.
116. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 64-65.
117. McDowell Statement, supra note 103, at 5.
118. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting FCC v.
Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)).
119. McDowell Statement, supra note 103, at 5 (stating that the Order requires the
Commission to change its prior interpretation of the Advanced Services Order).
120. Id. (“[T]he Order desperately scours the Act to find a tether to moor its alleged
Title I ancillary authority.”).
121. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 68-77.
122. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 645 (noting that to use its ancillary jurisdiction, the right
to do so must be ancillary to something already in the Act).
123. McDowell Statement, supra note 103, at 6.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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THE FCC’S RULES FAIL TO PROTECT CONSUMERS USING MOBILE
NETWORKS
MOBILE BROADBAND MUST BE PROTECTED BECAUSE IT WILL BECOME
THE PREDOMINATE MEANS TO ACCESS THE INTERNET

In order for net neutrality to effectively preserve the free and open Internet, mobile networks must receive the same protections given to fixed
networks. The rapid growth and development of mobile data demonstrates
the need for comprehensive protection of mobile networks if net neutrality
is to be preserved. Over 85% of American adults own cell phones.126 Mobile broadband is the fastest growing broadband segment, anticipated to
grow 130% over a five year period. 127 Just as cell phone use eclipsed landlines, mobile broadband usage is expected to surpass wireline broadband. 128 Even now, at times, wireless replaces traditional wireline services. 129
The growth in wireless data consumption is only expected to continue
as faster connections and new services become available.130 In the second
quarter of 2010 alone, wireless data-based revenues for the two largest
wireless carriers in the United States increased over 25%. 131 This rapid
growth can be attributed to several factors, including, a significant increase
in the number of handsets capable of high-speed data and large numbers of
connected devices such as e-readers, global positioning systems, and alarm
systems that access wireless carriers’ networks. 132 The growth in mobile
data, however, is not confined to just revenue. The number of people subscribing to wireless data plans is growing at a pace nearly equivalent to
wireless data revenue growth. 133 The two largest wireless carriers credit
data as the primary driver of wireless growth.134 Mobile networks are be126. John Horrigan, Wireless Internet Use, PEW RES. CENTER at 43 (July 2009),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/Wireless-Internet-Use-WithTopline.pdf.
127. Baker, supra note 5, at 5.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See 2nd Quarter 2010 Investor Briefing, AT&T (July 22, 2010),
http://www.att.com/Investor/Financial/Earning_Info/docs/2Q_10_IB_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter AT&T 2010 Briefing]; 2nd Quarter 2010 Earnings Conference Call, VERIZON (July 23,
2010), http://news.vzw.com/investor/20100723.pdf [hereinafter Verizon 2010 Briefing]
131. AT&T 2010 Briefing, supra note 130; Verizon 2010 Briefing, supra note 130
(averaging AT&T’s 27.2% growth rate and Verizon’s 23.8% growth year over year for the
second quarter).
132. AT&T 2010 Briefing, supra note 130.
133. Id.
134. Id.; 2nd Quarter 2010 Earnings Conference Call, VERIZON (July 23, 2010),
http://news.vzw.com/investor/20100723.pdf.
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coming the most important means of accessing the Internet. One recent
survey concluded that over thirty-five percent of adults with cell phones or
smartphones have accessed the internet using their mobile devices.135 It is
estimated that by the year 2020, the primary means of connecting to the
internet will be through the consumer’s smartphone or cell phone. 136 Further, the use of mobile broadband grows significantly with each generation. 137 Ninety-four percent of eighteen to twenty-nine year olds use their
cell phones or smartphones to access the Internet compared with ninety
percent of thirty to forty-nine year olds. 138 For eighteen to twenty-nine year
olds, the cell phone is already the preferred method of accessing the Internet. 139 Ninety-four percent of individuals in that age range use their cell
phones for internet access, significantly outpacing both desktop computers
and laptops. 140
These statistics clearly demonstrate one thing: mobile devices are becoming the predominate means to access the web and all of the applications
and services available through it. If mobile devices are to become the primary method for accessing internet content and services, the protections
afforded to it must be equivalent to those given to its fixed counterpart. The
rules adopted by the FCC fail to adequately protect mobile networks from
carriers’ interference because they create a separate, less stringent, set of
rules for mobile broadband networks. Failure to fully apply the NoBlocking Rule and the complete omission of the No Unreasonable Discrimination Rule for mobile networks will prove fatal to the preservation of a
free and open Internet. The following sections will discuss each rule and its
impact on mobile networks more thoroughly.
B.

TRANSPARENCY RULE

The first rule adopted by the FCC is a transparency rule. 141 The Transparency Rule requires that a person providing broadband services disclose a
number of items designed to protect consumers. 142 The rule is designed to
increase competition and foster trust between consumers and ISPs; encourage innovation by providing technical information to developers necessary
for the creation and development of “online content, applications, services,
Rainie, supra note 3, at 5.
Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, Future of the Internet III, PEW RES.
CENTER at 2 (Dec. 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/
2008/PIP_FutureInternet3.pdf.pdf.
137. Horrigan, supra note 126.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 54.
142. Id.
135.
136.
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and devices; to assess the risks and benefits of embarking on new projects;”
and increase the likelihood that broadband service providers will adhere to
the rules by allowing the internet community to identify “problematic conduct and suggest fixes.” 143 The rule requires providers to disclose “network
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband internet access services sufficient for consumers to make informed
choices regarding use of such services and for content, application, service,
and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.” 144 These required disclosures would include speed, the types of applications that can be used, and how the service provider inspects traffic.145
The Transparency Rule applies to both fixed and mobile broadband
providers. 146 Application to mobile networks is a positive step, but unfortunately, it is the only rule adopted to apply uniformly to fixed and mobile
broadband. 147 The Transparency Rule will be reasonably effective in meeting its goals as applied to mobile networks, but it still needs to be bolstered
by specifying the information required by the disclosures to protect consumers and developers adequately. 148 Under the rule as it is written, broadband providers have the discretion to determine on their own what information is necessary for consumers to make informed choices and for content,
application, service, and device providers to innovate. 149 The language or
terms service providers must use is also left to their discretion.150 While
micromanagement and over-regulation are harmful, if average consumers
cannot understand the information being disclosed, they will not be able to
make informed decisions and the rule will be meaningless. 151
C.

NO-BLOCKING RULE

The No-Blocking Rule is where the FCC began its departure from its
“one Internet” philosophy and effectually created two separate internets
based on method of access. 152 The No-Blocking Rule adopted by the FCC
143. Id. at 32-33.
144. Id. at 33.
145. Whitson Gordon, An Introduction to Net Neutrality: What It Is, What It Means
to You, and What You Can Do About It, LIFEHACKER (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://lifehacker.com/5720407/an-introduction-to-net-neutrality-what-it-is-what-it-meansfor-you-and-what-you-can-do-about-it.
146. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 55.
147. See Internet Rules, supra note 13.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Gordon, supra note 145 (“It does not necessarily mean that those disclosures
will be understandable by non-tech savvy individuals.”).
152. Genachowski Statement, supra note 95, at 4 (“There is one Internet, and it must
remain an open platform, however consumers and innovators access it.”).
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for fixed broadband prevents providers from blocking lawful content, applications, services, and non-harmful devices. 153 It allows consumers to go to
any website, use any service, or attach any equipment they choose, such as
a wireless router, to the network. In contrast, the rule adopted for mobile
networks, however, is much less comprehensive. This inadequacy impacts
mobile networks in two primary capacities: content and devices.
1.

Internet Content

The mobile No-Blocking Rule only prohibits blocking of lawful websites and voice or video telephony applications that compete with the providers’ own services. 154 The rule permits mobile broadband providers to
block access to nearly any application or service they choose. 155 It does not
protect content as the fixed line rule does, only access to the web.156 This
means that mobile broadband providers could deny users access to Facebook, Twitter, Hulu, or virtually any other site.157 The only blocking limitation for mobile operators, a restriction on blocking voice or video telephony
that competes with the providers’ own services, is inadequate to protect
consumers. This limitation was also, for all intents and purposes, obsolete
before it went into effect.
As smartphone growth surges, applications are becoming the primary
means of utilizing voice or video telephony services from phones. 158 These
applications are not accessed through a website, but rather through an application store, usually operated by the developer of the handset’s operating
system. 159 The rule does not apply to application stores,160 which allows the
ISP to restrict the availability of applications, such as Skype or Google
Voice, that compete with the mobile broadband providers’ own video or
153. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 37.
154. Id. at 55.
155. Id. at 37, 55. The No-Blocking Rule for mobile networks is limited to voice or
video telephony services that compete with their own. The No Blocking Rule for fixed networks, however, is not limited to competing voice or video telephony services. Id.
156. Id.
157. Gordon, supra note 145 (noting that an ISP could deliberately block a service at
any point they choose).
158. Kevin C. Tofel, iPhone and Android Fueling Worldwide Smartphone Growth,
GIGAOM (May 7, 2010), http://gigaom.com/mobile/iphone-and-android-fueling-worldwidesmartphone-growth/ (discussing the growth rate of smartphones at 56.7% in the first quarter
of 2010).
159. The two leading smartphone operating systems both use application stores.
Apple operates the iPhone App Store available through its iTunes program and Google operates the Android Marketplace for handsets that operate on its Android operating system. See
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/apps-for-iphone/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010);
ANDROID, https://market.android.com/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
160. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 57.
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voice telephony services, leaving the voice and video exception to the rule
hollow. 161 For mobile devices that do not currently utilize an application
store, the ISP can establish an application store and restrict the availability
of applications, such as Skype or Google Voice, to avoid the prohibition on
blocking competing voice or video telephony services.162
2.

Freedom of Devices

The rule also fails to prohibit blocking of non-harmful devices on mobile networks. This is the third internet freedom espoused in the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement, yet the Commission excluded it for mobile broadband in the rules the Commission adopted. 163 Freedom of devices is the
freedom of consumers to attach any legal device of their choice as long as
they do not harm the network. 164 This freedom is often referred to as Carterfone for mobile networks. 165 Carterfone is a 1968 FCC decision that held
that consumers could attach any device to the telephone network as long as
the device did not harm the network. 166 The Carterfone decision was published before mobile telephone networks existed and is thus limited to traditional landline telephone networks.167 The FCC has been asked to extend
Carterfone to mobile networks but the Commission has yet to make a ruling, leaving wireless carriers free to limit the devices that may attach to and
use their networks. 168 Extending Carterfone to mobile networks would benefit consumers and encourage innovation. The FCC declined, however, to
extend this principal to mobile networks in their net neutrality rules. 169
The extension of freedom of devices to mobile networks would impact
two separate areas of the mobile sector. 170 First, the decision would impair
the ability of the carriers to restrict which handsets can be used on their
network. 171 Freedom of devices would be a defining characteristic of the
161. Gordon, supra note 145.
162. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 57 (The rules are not intended to “limit mobile
broadband providers’ flexibility to curate their app stores . . .”).
163. Internet Policy Statement, supra note 15.
164. See Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 39 (discussing the No Blocking Rule for
wireline networks inclusion of the freedom to attach any device that does not harm the network).
165. See Clay, supra note 24; Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
166. Clay, supra note 24, at 717-18; Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll
Telephone Service, Decision, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968).
167. Clay, supra note 24, at 717-18.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 723.
170. See id. (analyzing whether carriers should be forced to allow any handset to
attach to their network); Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17 (explaining that
entrepreneurs will innovate new devices for unrestricted spectrum).
171. Clay, supra note 24, at 723-27.
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long-term development of future mobile networks. Limiting the carriers’
ability to control what devices connect to their networks, however, would
have little practical impact on the consumer’s choices of handsets for any
given network in the short term. Wireless carriers use different technologies
and frequencies that are typically not compatible with one another.172 Even
if Carterfone was extended to mobile networks, the incompatible technologies would typically prevent a phone purchased for one carrier to be moved
to another. 173 The two largest wireless carriers provide an example. Verizon
uses Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology for its wireless
network while AT&T network uses Global Systems for Mobile Communication (GSM) technology. 174 With the exception of a few phones that are
designed for both types of networks, a consumer typically cannot attach a
Verizon handset to the AT&T network, or vice versa, because the technologies used are fundamentally different and incapable of interoperability. 175
Further, the cost of wireless handsets limits the potential impact Carterfone would have on the types of handsets consumers use on their mobile
networks. Most consumers are accustomed to paying a relatively low price
for a mobile handset because wireless carriers subsidize the costs of handsets in exchange for a commitment by the consumer to use the carrier for
one or two years, accompanied by a sizeable termination fee if the consumer cancels early. 176 Without the commitment, the handset is substantially
more expensive. 177 Take Apple’s iPhone, for example. The iPhone is sold to
consumers at a cost of roughly $200. 178 The cost of the iPhone without a
contract is $649.00.179 Without subsidization by the carrier, handsets would
become prohibitively expensive. 180 The non-subsidized pricing model al172. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 105 (discussing the different wireless technologies
and how the carriers use different frequencies to avoid interference with one another).
173. Id.
174. Id. (discussing the different wireless technologies); see also VERIZON WIRELESS,
http://aboutus.vzw.com/ataglance.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010); AT&T,
http://www.att.com/gen/investor-relations?pid= 5711 (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (accessed
by selecting the Networks link in the left column).
175. Penchuk, supra note 17, at 105 (“[A] user . . . often was required to switch
handsets.”).
176. Clay, supra note 24, at 726 (discussing how the CTIA believes an open model
would actually lead to higher prices because the networks currently subsidize the cost of
handsets).
http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shop_iphone/family/
177. E.g.,
APPLE,
iphone/iphone4s (last visited Dec. 13, 2011) (showing the two year commitment price as
$199.99 and the price for the unlocked handset as $649.00).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Clay, supra note 24, at 726 (discussing how the CTIA believes an open model
would actually lead to higher prices because the networks currently subsidize the cost of
handsets).
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ready exists today. Unlocked handsets, ones that are not locked to a specific
wireless carrier so they can be used on any network supporting the handset’s technology, are available for consumers to purchase.181 The exorbitant
cost of these unlocked phones continues to drive consumers to the wireless
carriers or their partners to purchase subsidized handsets at lower costs.
The limitations imposed by incompatible technologies and costs, however, do not hold true past the short-term. The incompatibility issue could
be mitigated in the future as carriers migrate to newer technologies that are
more compatible with one another.182 Long Term Evolution (LTE), has
been chosen by many of the largest wireless carriers as the next generation
of their respective wireless networks. 183 It is anticipated that LTE could
“bring a unified standard and compatibility across carriers.” 184 If interoperability among wireless networks is realized, the ability of consumers to use
any phone they choose on any network will be essential to maintaining an
open Internet.
Second, and more importantly, not applying freedom of devices to
mobile broadband operators discourages innovation.185 The FCC should
have extended this freedom to mobile networks because it would fuel the
innovation of new types of devices capable of connecting to wireless networks. 186 The original Carterfone decision is credited for the explosion of
devices that connect to phone lines including the fax machine, answering
machine, and the modem, which eventually led to the mass adoption of the
Internet. 187 The carriers themselves credit large numbers of new, nonhandset devices such as global positioning systems, e-readers, and home
alarm systems as a large driver of data growth, demonstrating the growing
importance of protecting freedom of devices.188 Allowing freedom of devices on mobile networks would have the same type of effect on innovation
as it did for traditional landline networks. 189 New and innovative devices
are constantly being developed to accommodate a more mobile lifestyle. A
181. See, e.g., supra note 176 (showing the two year commitment price as $199.00
and the price for an unlocked handset as $649.00).
182. Emir Halepovic et al., Wireless Data Traffic: A Decade of Change, IEEE
NETWORK MAG., Mar. 24, 2009, at 21.
183. In the United States, the two largest wireless carriers, Verizon and AT&T, have
adopted
LTE
for
their
4G network
deployment. VERIZON WIRELESS,
http://aboutus.vzw.com/ataglance.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010); AT&T,
http://www.att.com/gen/investor-relations?pid= 5711 (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (accessed
by selecting the Networks link in the left column).
184. Halepovic, supra note 182.
185. Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra Part IV.
189. Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
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recent example is the tablet computer, like the Apple iPad or the Samsung
Tab, which in many cases, is specifically designed to access mobile networks. The potential for other types of devices is limited only by one’s imagination. 190
The FCC’s failure to adopt protections for non-harmful devices could
be fatal to a truly free and open mobile internet.191 Protecting the freedom
to attach any device to the network on more mature, fixed networks while
excluding the same freedom for rapidly developing mobile broadband networks is counter-intuitive. It also contradicts the Commission’s mandate to
encourage advanced telecommunications services.192 As demonstrated by
the Carterfone decision for fixed telephone networks, fostering innovation,
investment, and competition is the best method for promoting the development of advanced technologies. 193 The rules’ lack of protection for freedom
of devices on mobile networks will continue to suppress innovation of devices, limiting development to the carriers and their affiliates, resulting in
reduced competition.
The No-Blocking Rule must be applied uniformly to mobile broadband networks, as it is to fixed broadband networks, if an open Internet is to
be preserved. The statistics show that mobile internet will become the predominate means of internet access. 194 As the Commission recognizes in its
Order, and some commissioners do in their statements, “[t]here is one Internet, which should remain open for consumers and innovators alike, although it may be accessed through different technologies and services.” 195
Despite the Commission’s recognition that there is one Internet that should
be protected equally, the FCC fails to afford mobile broadband the NoBlocking protections required to ensure that the Internet remains free and
open.
190. See,
e.g.,
iPad
Technical
Specifications,
APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/ipad/specs/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (showing the 3G model is
designed to access wireless networks); Samsung Galaxy Tab 7.0, SAMSUNG,
http://www.samsung.com/us/mobile/galaxy-tab/SGH-T849ZKATMB (last visited Feb. 13,
2010) (showing the Galaxy Tab as having 3G wireless connectivity).
191. Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
192. See Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 64 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §1302) (stating that
Section 706 confers an affirmative duty to “encourage the deployment of ‘advanced telecommunications capability’”).
193. Engadget Explains Net Neutrality, supra note 17.
194. Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, Future of the Internet III, PEW RES.
CENTER,
2
(2008),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP_FutureInternet3.pdf.pdf (stating that mobile will be the predominate method of accessing the internet by 2020).
195. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 52; Genachowski Statement, supra note 95, at
4 (“There is one Internet, and it must remain an open platform, however consumers and
innovators access it.”); Copps Statement, supra note 104, at 4 (reiterating the quote from the
Order).
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NO UNREASONABLE DISCRIMINATION RULE

The FCC further departs from its “one Internet” philosophy with the
No Unreasonable Discrimination Rule. The rule was adopted for fixed
broadband networks, but was completely abandoned for consumers using
mobile broadband networks. 196 The rule for fixed networks prevents service
providers from slowing or degrading traffic based on the type of service or
application, or its content. 197 It essentially prevents situations like the one
that arose in Comcast Corp. v. FCC, where Comcast was slowing traffic
from BitTorrent just because it was coming from that particular site.198 It
also prevents fixed broadband service providers from slowing traffic that
competes with its own services or those of an affiliate. Further, the rule
states that paid prioritization arrangements are not likely to satisfy this 199
and ISPs would be required to show that the “arrangement is not harmful
and is consistent with the public interest.”200 While many feel the No Unreasonable Discrimination Rule should have completely prohibited paid
prioritization agreements, they agree it is a step in the right direction.201
Unfortunately, these protections do not apply to mobile broadband
networks. The failure to adopt the No Unreasonable Discrimination Rule
for mobile networks has serious implications for users who access the web
from their mobile devices. Mobile providers are left free to slow or degrade
the traffic to or from any site or service.202 Furthermore, it allows the providers to slow traffic to sites such as Netflix or Hulu that compete with their
own or their affiliates’ services, or social media sites such as Facebook and
Twitter. It also allows them to circumvent the No-Blocking Rule because
they can slow or degrade voice or video telephony services that compete
with their own, so long as they do not render those services unusable. 203
196. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 58 (declining to adopt a No Unreasonable
Discrimination Rule in favor of continued monitoring to see how mobile networks develop).
197. Id. at 40 (“A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access service. Reasonable network management shall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.”).
198. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
199. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 43 (stating that pay for priority will “raise
significant cause for concern”).
200. Clyburn Statement, supra note 104, at 1.
201. See id.; Copps Statement, supra note 104, at 4 (“Among the many improvements to the Order we achieved, we now at least conclude that ‘pay for priority’ arrangements generally violate our ‘no unreasonable discrimination’ rule”).
202. Gordon, supra note 145.
203. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 56 (“[D]egrading a particular website or an
application that competes with the provider’s voice or video telephony services so as to
render the website or application effectively unusable would be considered tantamount to
blocking.”).
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The FCC has left the decision of what sites and services are available from
mobile devices to their mobile broadband providers and not the users,
where it belongs.
The exemption has another significant impact on what mobile broadband network operators are allowed to do. Unlike fixed broadband, the general principle that paid prioritization agreements will not satisfy the No
Unreasonable Discrimination Rule does not apply to mobile networks since
the rule itself was not applied.204 This leaves mobile broadband providers
free to create a fast lane for companies that can afford it and a slow lane for
everyone else. Companies like Facebook or Netflix may have to pay extra
to be delivered over a mobile service provider’s network or the network
may charge the user an additional fee to access the content.205 The result of
such arrangements will be to stifle innovation and competition and to suppress free speech. 206
E.

THE FCC’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LESS PROTECTIVE RULES FOR MOBILE
BROADBAND NETWORKS AND WHY THEY ARE DEFECTIVE

The net neutrality rules adopted by the FCC closely resemble a legislative framework that Google and Verizon recently proposed.207 The exemption for the mobile networks has been supported by other wireless carriers,
including AT&T, the second-largest. 208 Internet service providers have
good reason to want to exclude mobile internet from regulation, and their
arguments prevailed in the rules adopted by the FCC. For the top two carriers alone, mobile broadband is over a twenty billion dollar a year business. 209 The industry’s desire to exempt wireless networks from net neutrality is focused on industry interests and not consumer protections. Unfortunately for consumers, the FCC agreed with them. The FCC’s Order establishing net neutrality rules gave several justifications for excluding mobile
broadband protections. 210 The Commission advances mobile networks’
early developmental stage, moves toward openness in the mobile market,
market competition, and network management as reasons mobile networks
Id. at 58.
Gordon, supra note 145.
See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.
Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal, supra note 10.
Greg Bessinger, AT&T Says Google-Verizon Internet Plan ‘Reasonable,’
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-11/at-t-wirelesschief-says-google-verizon-internet-plan-reasonable-.html.
209. 2nd Quarter 2010 Investor Briefing, AT&T (July 22, 2010),
http://www.att.com/Investor/Financial/Earning_Info/docs/ 2Q_10_IB_FINAL.pdf; 2nd
(July
23,
2010),
Quarter
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Earnings
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VERIZON
http://news.vzw.com/investor/20100723.pdf.
210. FCC Press Release, supra note 94.
204.
205.
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207.
208.
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should not be regulated as comprehensively. 211 The justifications given by
the FCC do not hold water when they are scrutinized.
The first three arguments can be quickly dismissed. It is counterintuitive to assert that there is one Internet regardless of how it is accessed 212 and then create distinctions in how it is regulated. The Commission explicitly states in the Order that the Internet has thrived because of its
openness and freedom. 213 It then chooses not to protect that openness and
freedom for the fastest-growing broadband segment. 214 The decision to exclude mobile networks based on the technology’s infancy is illogical. The
early developmental stage of mobile broadband networks is one of the primary reasons to adopt net neutrality rules. Application of the FCC’s Order
to mobile broadband would ensure its future as free and open and development of mobile networks would evolve around these core principals.
The moves toward openness in the mobile market are at the least inadequate, if not completely frivolous, to justify exempting mobile broadband networks from the rule. The FCC cites a spectrum auction that imposed openness rules as one justification. 215 That auction, however, involved primarily only one wireless carrier, Verizon. 216 The FCC uses the
openness of Google’s Android operating system as an example. 217 Open
operating systems have absolutely no bearing on the mobile networks’
openness. 218 If the mobile broadband network operator does not allow the
traffic on the network, it is inconsequential that one has the ability to download the application to a handset. 219
The competitive nature of the mobile broadband marketplace is also
asserted by the FCC as a reason for not adopting more stringent mobile
broadband protections. 220 This argument is also flawed. The marketplace is
not competitive; rather it functions as an oligopoly. 221 The largest wireless
carriers discourage price competition by matching each other’s prices.
211. Id.
212. Internet Rules, supra note 13, at 52.
213. Id. at 3.
214. Baker, supra note 5, at 5.
215. FCC Press Release, supra note 94 (stating that the upper 700 MHz of the Cblock spectrum auction rules on openness should soon affect the market).
216. Robert Holmes, Verizon Wins ‘C-Block’ in Spectrum Auction, THE STREET
(Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.thestreet.com/ story/10408801/verizon-wins-c-block-inspectrum-auction.html.
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Nearly every price point is identical for the nation’s top two mobile operators, Verizon and AT&T. 222 There is no downward pressure being applied
on price by either of the largest carriers, and thus no real competition for
price.
The argument that mobile networks require more management deserves more attention than the other justifications for excluding mobile.
Carriers argue 223 and the FCC agrees, that the differences between mobile
networks and traditional wireline networks make it necessary to impose
fewer restrictions on mobile networks.224 There are certain challenges that
are unique to operating a mobile network and some network problems manifest more acutely in mobile networks than in their wireline counterparts. 225 The most significant of these challenges, the one most commonly
asserted by carriers as the basis for the distinction between wireless and
wireline networks, is the limited amount of wireless spectrum available. 226
Wireless spectrum consists of blocks of radio frequencies that mobile devices use to communicate with a cell tower when placing a call or initiating
a data session. 227 Mobile broadband providers point to the scarcity of spectrum as one of the primary reasons that wireless networks require more
management than fixed networks. 228 They emphasize the need to manage
traffic on mobile networks to ensure a consistent customer experience. 229
Wireless carriers argue that network management is intended to prevent a
few heavy users who are streaming movies or downloading large files from
consuming the network’s entire bandwidth capacity, inhibiting others from
being able to access the network. 230 This argument’s legitimacy will rapidly
decline as more wireless spectrum becomes available.
While the lack of available wireless spectrum is a legitimate concern,
there are other ways to address the problem that provide a satisfactory solution without excluding mobile broadband networks from the important net
222. Verizon rate plans are available at www.verizonwireless.com and AT&T’s rate
plans are available at wireless.att.com.
223. Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal, supra note 10.
224. See Internet Rules, supra note 13.
225. Baker, supra note 5 (discussing how the rapid growth in mobile data is exhausting available wireless spectrum).
226. Id. at 4 ([N]othing is more critical than the lack of additional spectrum”).
227. See
Definition
of
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PHONESCOOP,
http://www.phonescoop.com/glossary/term.php?gid=90 (last visited October 12, 2010).
228. AT&T Says F.C.C. Neutrality Suggests a ‘Bait and Switch’, N.Y. TIMES.COM
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/att-calls-fcc-net-neutrality-ideabait-and-switch/ (quoting AT&T as saying that networks “are facing incredible bandwidth
strain”).
229. Id. (quoting AT&T as saying networks will “require . . . pro-active network
management”).
230. See discussion and accompanying text supra Part II.
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neutrality rules. 231 The most practical solution is for the FCC to allocate
more spectrum for use by mobile devices. 232 There is not a true lack of additional spectrum available; rather there is general agreement that the current allocation and use of wireless spectrum is inefficient and inadequate.233
The FCC recognized the shortage of available spectrum due to inefficient
use and allocation and has even taken some small steps to help resolve the
problem. 234 The Commission recently auctioned some available wireless
spectrum to carriers in addition to releasing wireless spectrum called “white
space.” 235 Further, additional wireless spectrum will become available from
the carriers themselves as they move to the next generation of wireless
technology. 236 As carriers transition customers from second generation (2G)
and third generation (3G) wireless technologies to fourth generation (4G)
technology, the spectrum utilized by the older technologies will become
available for reallocation. 237 Carriers could then reuse the available spectrum in their 4G networks to increase its capacity, allowing for more data to
be moved across it. 238 Additionally, there is a significant amount of unused
spectrum that, if made available to the carriers, could reduce or eliminate
the need for the carriers to perform additional network management above
that of their fixed counterparts altogether.239 These potential solutions show
that there are viable options to solve the problem of spectrum shortage and
negate the basis of FCC’s claim that the need for network management requires that mobile networks be given less protection than fixed networks.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Mobile broadband networks must have enforceable rules to safeguard
the traffic that passes through them. Failure to rapidly protect mobile net231. See generally Baker, supra note 5; Wu, supra note 4.
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works would compromise net neutrality for the entire Internet. Mobile networks are the fastest growing broadband segment and will soon be the predominate means of accessing internet content. Net neutrality protections
will become meaningless unless they are protected. The FCC must act
quickly to adequately protect mobile networks by adopting enforceable and
comprehensive rules that safeguard mobile networks to the same extent as
fixed networks.
The net neutrality rules adopted by the FCC are insufficient to protect
mobile networks for two reasons. First, the rules are unenforceable because
they lack a sufficient legal foundation. The Comcast court clearly stated
that the FCC does not possess the authority to regulate the Internet because
it does not fall in either their direct or ancillary jurisdiction.240 Congressional delegation of authority to regulate the Internet to the FCC is clearly the
most desirable scenario to remedy this problem. Absent quick action from
Congress, however, the FCC must reclassify broadband services to adopt
enforceable and comprehensive net neutrality rules for mobile broadband
networks that truly protect the freedom and openness that have made the
Internet the most successful and powerful communications tool in history.
Regardless of enforceability, the framework of the rules makes them
inadequate to protect mobile networks, their users, and developers from the
tampering and interference of internet service providers. In order to adequately protect mobile networks, more stringent and comprehensive restrictions must be placed upon the ability of service providers to block or otherwise manage traffic based on content. Full application of the No-Blocking
and No Unreasonable Discrimination rules, including freedom of devices,
must be extended to mobile networks. Failure to do so jeopardizes nothing
less than the key characteristics of the most powerful communications tool
the world has ever seen and leaves millions of internet users subjugated to
corporate America’s bottom line.
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